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Before moving on to an examination of the mining labour supply system, and 
policy and stategy used to articulate it, attention should be directed 
briefly at the character of the Chamber of Mines (C.M.). 
« 
THE CHAMBER OF MINES 
The Chamber, set up in 1899, essentially represents the collective interests 
of its affiliate members on a wide range of pertinent matters. It is the 
"lynchpin" of the industry, even for non-members, and is a key element in 
the foreign labour network. Its ordinary membership (in 1975) was composed 
of 116 producers, 46 of whom were in gold mining and 43 in coal production. 
There were 14 financial corporations - key "controlling interests" which have 
always been highly monopolistic - as well as other members in various sub-
sectors, here including diamonds, platinum,antimony, asbestos, copper and 
base metals. The Chamber has had-a "merger arrangement" (since 1975) with 
the Natal Coal Owners' Society. All these producers have made and continue 
to make extensive use of foreign African workers. 
Because of the significance of gold, the Gold Producers' Committee sits at 
the apex of power within the "mining complex". As one observer has commented, 
it is the "inner sanctum of the industry (and) its deliberations are as 
secret as those of a cabinet".1 It could be added, they are also of similar 
import in certain respects. Gold mining is also the sub-sector with the 
heaviest dependence on foreign labour. 
A reading of the Annual Reports of the C.M. provides sufficient evidence of 
its multifarious interests and significance. Its own budget - for admini-
stration, gold marketing, public relations, training and research - runs in 
excess of R17 million annually. 
Key amongst its activities is the regulation of labour supply and employment 
policy. Here there is considerable collusion over basic industry policy. 
It is expressed through the seven "mining houses" which compose the Chamber 
and account for the bulk of workers employed in gold, ccfal and other mining 
production. However, as the recent past has indicated, the C.M. has no executive 
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power on this issue. The actual recruitment and supply of labour to in-
dividual mines both from South Africa and supplier States is managed by a 
parallel organisation - Mine Labour Organisations (Ltd.), which includes 
the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (Wenela) and the Native Recruit-
ment Corporation (NRC) - the members of which are individual corporations, 
most of whom are also members of the Chamber. For all intent and practical 
purpose, the C^ and MLO are one, despite the administrative necessity and 
fiction of a separate corporate legal persona. It should also be noted that 
t 
on-site labour policies fall into the jurisdiction of the individual companies 
who must meet CM stipulated minimum conditions and MLO contractual requirements. 
The relative distribution of African labour between mining houses is illus-
trated in Table 1. Anglo American Corporation remains supreme with Rand 
Mines, Unicorporation and Goldfields each having roughly half as many em-
ployees. A complete analysis of the interlocking directorates and cross-
holdings of investments does not exist, suffice it to say that from avail-
? 
able evidence it is clear that the mining houses are closely linked. There 
.1 
is unfortunately no available breakdown of foreign/local labour ratios for 
these mining houses. 
The essential objective of the individual mining companies, their mining house 
groups and the industry is the securement of profits for shareholders, the 
latter being many in number, although concentrated in terms of relative power 
of control. Labour supply policy remains necessarily subordinate to this 
basic objective - policies for the securement of which change from time to 
time - and, indeed, can be understood as such. This is not, however, to deny 
some existant or potential latitude of manoevreability in policy. Policy 
and stategy on foreign African labour supply, nonetheless, has been, and 
indeed remains, fundamental in this overall equation. 
The success of policy - including the rapid substitution of local for foreign 
labour in recent times - is summed up in the revenue, costs and profits 
position for 1970-75 (see Table 2). Average revenue per metric ton has tripled 
to R34.45 whilst working costs have only doubled in current price terms to 
R16.71. As a result, working profits per metric ton have rocketed from R3.90 
to R17.74, reaching a 1974 peak, under pressure of a gold price close to 
US$ 200 per ounce, of R21.52. Not all sub-sectors have fared this well, however, 
but the relative importance and re-vitalisation of gold tias substantially 
affected the industry position. 
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The performance has been most rewarding to capital, the value of dividends 
rising from R143.5 million in 1970 to R522.8 million in 1975 (see Table 3). 
The dividend value per kilogram of gold has risen even more sharply, by more 
than 400 percent. Throughout this period, except for 1975, the dividend/'non-
white1 (gold and coal) wage bill ratio rose, suggesting a distributional bias 
against this source of labour. 
Indeed, the maintenance of such a growth record during a period of much up-
heaval in labour supply patterns attests to the resi1ience of the CM's labour 
supply policy and strategy as well as the power of adaptation of the industry 
to changing circumstances. It is also, however, a testimony to the weakness 
of labour - largely foreign-rooted - and its ability to secure a larger di-
vision of the fruits of production. These dual inter-related perspectives 
are examined below in a sequence which follows, firstly, policies adopted 
from the interface at which capital confronts labour for recruitment, through 
the network of transmission of workers to the depots and mines in South Africa, 
ultimately leading to discharge of the worker through temporary or permanent 
"displacement" from the "mining complex", and, secondly, the strategic design 
of the CM/MLO modus operandi in the Southern African economic complex. 
I POLICY ON LABOUR SUPPLY, EMPLOYMENT AND "DISPLACEMENT" 
Here the focus is on four separable but inter-related processes: the secure-
ment of foreign labour and policy prior to arrival in South Africa; policy 
before arrivalatthe point of production; policy during employment; and the 
processes and policy of discharging and "recycling" labour supplies. 
THE CONTRACT LABOUR RECRUITMENT NETWORK 
Contract labour recruitment from supplier States is the monopoly of the Wenela/ 
NRC or MLO. In one sense, this is a unique "multinational corporation", being 
in the import/export "business" for a unique commodity - labour-time. The MLO 
does not, however, seek directly to make a profit for its members. Dividends 
are neither declared nor paid. Members take out shares for the purposes not 
only of funding the enterprise itself but also for securement of a right of 
entitlement to purchase contract "labour-time" from the MLO. It is important 
tostressthis latter point. Members do take MLO recruitees under contract but 
the cost of contractees is paid into a "Labour Charges Paid Account" to which 
members contribute on a "cost per shift worked" basis. This charge is thus 
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levied not on number of labourers employed but the volume of labour-time 
they provide. The charge has risen from 12 cents per shift in 1970 to 16 
cents per shift for (post-April) 1974 and 29 cents per shift in (March) 
1976. Since this latter date, the charge has been lowered to 26 cents per 
shift. The percentage rise in this supplier cost has been lower than the 
rise in underground wage minima. It has thus been a falling proportion of 
the latter. 
The fact that it is "labour-time" which is sold to members and mining pro-
ducers has important implications. It gives each member a direct interest 
in a low labour securement cost. It provides the MLO lobby with a powerful 
back-up of corporate support vis-a-vis its sources of labour because factors 
pushing up securement costs - like rising attestation fees, supplier State 
charges ect. - inflict like damage on all. It also "averages" costs across 
producers, thereby in effect giving each member an equivalent starting point 
in the pursuit of profits. This may (at least in theory) work to aid less 
efficient producers or those who in other circumstances would find difficulty 
.1 
in obtaining labour supply without an improvement in wages and conditions. 
Further, the formula makes the industry as a whole bear.the brunt of "disturb-
ing considerations" such as strikes, inefficiency in the labour supplying 
network, abscondment and the built-in high contract labour turnover level. 
It can thus be surmised that factors affecting foreign labour supply are of 
much consequence to all producers, even those who only rely on a relatively 
small proportion of foreign, labour. If those who do rely on foreign con-
tractees were to bid locally, marginal producers and others might well be 
seriously affected. 
The reasons why contract recruitment from supplier States is "privatised" 
are historical. The Chamber, it is reported, has always had an efficient re-
cruitment system. It has thus been logical for the government to allow its 
continued functioning, as it has done under a 1937 Act to give the CM a monopoly 
in the foreign contract labour market. Nonetheless, a few private contractors 
do still exist in the local labour market.^ The latter supply not only the 
mines but other sectors as well (cf. the Sugar Industry Labour Organisation). 
Only about 1500 workers enter the mines via private contractors who normally 
secure contracts with a particular mining company. This practice is apparently most 
extensive in the Transkei, being grafted on to a trader network. However, as 
with the MLO, private contractors sell labour-time. Thus their charges vary: 
often R8 for a 6 month contract, R9 for a 9 month contract and Rl2 for 12 months.5 
4 5 / . 
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The MLO operates firmly in conjunction with the CM, the members of which are 
simultaneously both its shareholders and its clientele. Its managerial staff 
have decades of experience in the field, together with an intimate knowledge 
of supplier areas and the "nooks and crannies" of the system.^ This longevity 
of experience, backed up by an efficient and professional Head Office organ-
isation,with ample finance because of an "assured market", makes the MLO a 
formidable employer body in the southern sub-continent. Its depot system 
spreads throughout Southern Africa and provides the organisation with basic 
information and intelligence on local conditions and prospective labour sur-
pluses. 
The functions of the MLO's subsidiaries - Wenela, which operates outside of 
South Africa and the BLS States, and the NRC, which covers these latter 
two areas - are various. The MLO ensures that contactees comply with all 
the labour laws of supplier areas, e.g. with regard to documentation and the 
specific inter-State contract conditions under which recruitment takes place. 
It also takes responsibility for the transport of contractees, their sub-
sistence en route and arrangements for return to the point of recruitment at 
the expiration of contract. The individual MLO authorities in each supplier 
State control subsidiary agencies throughout the network. They help Head 
Office articulate its supply requirements with "needs" as determined by pro-
duction levels, trends in forms of labour requested and projected demand. In 
addition, the central office in a supplier State will maintain all essential 
links with supplier State bodies, politicians, bureaucrats and local employers 
(if need be). It also "projects" propaganda at its "supply source" in order 
to make easier>and cheapen securement costs of,the "flow" of labour to its 
depots. This is an exercise in "image management" which has been made con-
siderably easier of late by the rise in the CM stipulated wage minima on mines. 
An important function relates to the initial screening of applicants for jobs. 
Not all who arrive at the depot are instantly employed. A primary selection 
process is undertaken in the supplier State before expenditure of monies to 
get the prospective miner to South Africa where further and more rigourous 
criteria may be applied. Certain age groups are for the most part specifically 
excluded, e.g. those over 40 years who are considered "too old". So too are 
the infirm, the feeble-looking, criminals, those with current records of con-
tagious disease, and persons who are seriously under-weight or "too small" in 
size. 
45/. 
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some manoeverability in bargaining. And, perhaps in the longer term, sur-
pluses can be used for minimising the pressure to upwardly adjust wages at 
a rate in excess of changes in the consumer price index. 
The control of expenditures not only has relevance for the charges levied 
in the "Labour Charges Pool.Account" but also for the broad shuffling of 
"budget" or "target" requirements between supplier States and depots. In 
a sense, a degree of "optimisation" is sought here but within broad strategic 
• 
considerations. Thus although "cost per recruit" can vary greatly - up to 
R40 at some local depots but often more in far-flung States - different 
area "budget" targets do not merely reflect such levels of efficiency. A 
desire for "spread", maintenance of a large number of supplier States in 
order to enable a wide distribution of the demand for foreign labour, and 
security of inflow, are factors which dictate a more cautious and constrained 
supply policy. 
The overall "insights" of 78 years of operating experience do not eliminate 
the existence of problems for the MLO in its securement of foreign and local 
labour supplies. Certain basic problems do exist for all its sub-divisions, 
from Head Office to the depots. 
Firstly, the establishment and maintenance of depots involves fixed investments 
in buildings and an element of variable cost depending on staffing and "through-
puts". Often, over a period of time, these are adjusted to the "historical 
record" and little new investment and capital or outlay of finance may be re-
quired. But, as in recent times of flux in the labour supply pattern, major 
shifts of investment funds have become necessary. Nonetheless, the MLO has 
been (wisely) reluctant to instantly abandon facilities when supplies have 
dried up, e.g. in the case of Malawi where the MLO has maintained "unused 
facilities" since April 1974 when Dr Banda cut off the flow of contract labour 
to the Republic and Rhodesia. If the "planned" inflow of 20,000 Malawians in 
1977 is realised,the "care and maintenance" policy will have been fully justi-
fied.^ Even if it is not, the investment will have been unavoidable for at 
least a short-term period, if viewed in strategic cost/benefit terms. Indeed, 
the MLO has always been prepared to "sit such situations out" over lengthy 
periods of time. Thus, for example, the MLO kept its links with Tanzania un-
« 
til 1970 even though President Nyerere had banned recruitment in 1961. The 
"final blow"was the expropriation without compensation of the MLO's last pro-
perty at Tukuyu.11 On the same principle, the MLO can be expected to maintain 
45/. 
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At the point of recruitment, relatively simple tests have been used for 
selection. However, they have been found to have an implicit scientific 
basis. Thus the Chamber's Research Review (1963) reports that the weight/ 
categorisation method used for many years has had some logical validity.^ 
s 
Those placed in Category A (130 lb minimum weight) almost all had sufficient 
o 
"working capacity for moderate rates of work." But it also brought out the 
fact that there might have resulted "considerable wastage among the men as-
signed to Category B, that is, men of less than 130 lb weight, because about 
85 percent of these men proved to have adequate physical working capacities g 
for moderate work". Nowadays, however, standardised mine wage minima do not 
themselves reflect categorisation (or weight). For this reason, it has been 
all the more important for the MLO depots to pre-select on an implicit or 
explicit height/weight basis. 
The MLO organisations in supplier States must also keep records of recruit-
ment, expenditures, deferred pay, repatriations and a number of other in-
dicators which enable an informed assessment of problems of the system's 
performance. 
A major concern is to fulfil the "budget" or "target" set by Head Office 
planners. These are annually allocated between different supplier States 
and form working guidelines on short-term policy. They are also intensively 
discussed at Annual Conferences of the MLO. Of course, too, "targets" are 
designed to fit into overall strategic supply conditions and the latest data 
on projected trends in industry demand. Some flexibility is also allowed in 
this quarter, the "success" of one area being used to offset (perhaps local-
ised and temporary) problems in another area. It is also more and more per-
tinent these days to observe that the MLO does not appear to operate in such 
a way as to "flood" mines with supplies with the purpose of "driving down" 
wage rates. More typically, and in a fashion more appreciative of the require-
ments of large-scale corporate planning, the wage exists as a pre-condition 
of recruitment, supluses arising for reasons other than "high wages". Indeed, 
the existence of "localised surplus", sometimes of considerable magnitude, 
has not simply translated into an action by the CM/MLO to cut wage rates 
directly. Such surpluses can be systemically"functional" in other ways. They 
enforce "discipline" amongst contractees, give greater opportunity for produc-
tivity-geared selection at the point of recruitment, enable "repats" to be 
* 
easily replaced, provide "leeway" in planning,and enable a reduction in the 
feasibility of inter-State collusion against the MLO as employer by providing 
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some manoeverability in bargaining. And, perhaps in the longer term, sur-
pluses can be used for minimising the pressure to upwardly adjust wages at 
a rate in excess of changes in the consumer price index. 
The control of expenditures not only has relevance for the charges levied 
in the "Labour Charges Pool Account" but also for the broad shuffling of 
"budget" or "target" requirements between supplier States and depots. In 
a sense, a degree of "optimisation" is sought here but within broad strategic 
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considerations. Thus although "cost per recruit" can vary greatly - up to 
R40 at some local depots but often more in far-flung States - different 
area "budget" targets do not merely reflect such levels of efficiency. A 
desire for "spread", maintenance of a large number of supplier States in 
order to enable a wide distribution of the demand for foreign labour, and 
security of inflow, are factors which dictate a more cautious and constrained 
supply policy. 
The overall "insights" of 78 years of operating experience do not eliminate 
the existence of problems for the MLO in its securement of foreign and local 
labour supplies. Certain basic problems do exist for all its sub-divisions, 
from Head Office to the depots. 
Firstly, the establishment and maintenance of depots involves fixed investments 
in buildings and an element of variable cost depending on staffing and "through-
puts". Often, over a period of time, these are adjusted to the "historical 
record" and little new investment and capital or outlay of finance may be re-
quired. But, as in recent times of flux in the labour supply pattern, major 
shifts of investment funds have become necessary. Nonetheless, the MLO has 
been (wisely) reluctant to instantly abandon facilities when supplies have 
dried up, e.g. in the case of Malawi where the MLO has maintained "unused 
facilities" since April 1974 when Dr Banda cut off the flow of contract labour 
to the Republic and Rhodesia. If the "planned" inflow of 20,000 Malawians in 
1977 is realised,the "care and maintenance" policy will have been fully justi-
fied.^® Even if it is not, the investment will have been unavoidable for at 
least a short-term period, if viewed in strategic cost/benefit terms. Indeed, 
the MLO has always been prepared to "sit such situations out" over lengthy 
periods of time. Thus, for example, the MLO kept its links with Tanzania un-
o 
til 1970 even though President Nyerere had banned recruitment in 1961. The 
"final blow"was the expropriation without compensation of the MLO's last pro-
perty at Tukuyu.1^ On the same principle, the MLO can be expected to maintain 
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unused facilities along the NE Transvaal/Mocambique border and await possible 
change in the conditions existing in that area which have eliminated previous 
movement of labour across the border through the Kruger National Park. 
Secondly, most depots and central facilities in supplier States have short-
term capacity constraints. This makes instant re-allocation of supply quotas 
difficult but, as time goes by, progressively more manageable. Hence, pro-
blems in one supplier area can usually in the longer term be overcome by the 
re-deployment of personnel, investment funds, finance and "budgets". With 
the development of labour surpluses in most supplier States, as well as much 
flexibility in South Africa itself, this strategy has become more feasible 
compared to past periods in which MLO recruited on the basis of locally un-
competitive wages. 
TRANSMISSION BETWEEN DEPOT AND RECIPIENT STATE 
The transport of recruitees from depots to SouthAfrica is a cost financed by 
the MLO. Differences in costs between supplier States exist, reflecting 
various considerations, and make for a variegated cost structure applicable 
to this component of the labour supply system. 
Some workers travel by rail on tickets bought by the MLO (e.g. Basotho); others 
go by air (e.g. those formerly from Malawi and now from Rhodesia). For these 
latter purposes, the MLO operates an air network of 6 aircraft - Wenela Air 
Services - which up to 1974 had flown 1,833,454 passengers a total of 
1,092,310,508 passenger miles, making it one of the most important air networks 
12 
on the continent. For infringements of air monopolies - e.g. in the case 
of Air Rhodesia's franchise - Wenela pays a levy of $RH 5.00. In other circum-
stances it has made use of national airline facilities, e.g. Air Malawi, and 
of course airport facilities, not to mention a special terminal facility at 
Jan Smuts. For various reasons plans have also been made to fly recruits from 
Maseru to Weikom as well as from internal supply sources (e.g. Umtata, Kokstad 
13 
and N. Natal). The advantage of air travel is found in savings in time, 
during which prior to employment workers are "unproductive"; but naturally 
the practice raises nominal travel costs, especially given recent price rises 
in aviation fuels. 
A less regular transport "flow" relates to "incidentally repatriated" workers 
a 
("repats" as they are known in the "trade"). However, historical experience 
has become a good guide in such matters, the levels being "predictable" within 
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a certain margin. Nonetheless, on occasions problems with the repatriation 
of strikers,workers "walking-off" the mine etc., have arisen. Repatriation 
is a liability of the MLO under inter-State agreements. 
BUREAUCRATISATION AT THE RECRUITMENT DEPOT 
Contractees, many in number, attest under signature or thumb print (though 
the latter is always otherwise required, regardless of the recruitee's edu-
cation). Significantly, contracts are standardised and each contractee is 
processed through a medical examination under the ILO Convention for mine-
workers, which involves a mandatory but not legally required act of public 
stripping (at least in the case of Basotho from Maseru).14 This test is 
usually minor, being restricted to heart-beat monitoring. Here too, creden-
tials relevant to the supplier State are checked and details noted. Travel 
documents (e.g. the Rhodesian Worker Travel Document) are also issred and 
put in order. The recruit is then listed, numbered and noted in the bureau-
cratic record. He is subsequently transported, or given the necessary re-
quisites for securing transport, to South Africa where further processing is 
also required. 
MEDICAL EXAMINATION AT JOHANNESBURG AND WELKOM 
Recruits go to the (Mzilikazi) mine labour hospital at Welkom or to the Johannes-
burg centre - the central depots in South Africa for processing incoming mine-
workers. At these places, a major requirement is the (second) medical exam-
ination, consisting of a physical, X-Rays and fingerprinting. 
Attitudes of miners to this process have been described in recent studies, 
negative comment being directed at "rough handling", the nature of the physi-
cal and conditions for fingerprinting.15 Much attention has been directed at 
the mass "public stripping" demanded of recruits. There is no doubt that such 
practices, where they take place, can only be considered as adjuncts to the 
exercise of social control over labour and as acts designed to subordinate the 
worker to the power of the agents of his employing authority. Nonetheless, 
a more significant rationale can be found for medical examination, whatever 
its format. 
A basic and specified condition of health is sought in workers, and, in 
— • 
addition, this must be found in that segment of the labour force which ex-
hibits particular demographic characteristics. The medical examination is a 
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screening process facilitating identification of states of health as well 
as the extent to which applicants meet a pre-planned and specified labour 
demand. The usual standard requirements are a minimum weight of 50 kgs, age 
of 18 years (but usually below 40 years, dependent on physique) and X-Ray 
clearance for TB, other contagious diseases, pneumoconiosis, epilepsy, or 
1 c 
"mental defects" and deficient lungs. Rejectees are either repatriated 
(in the case of severe cases) or, in the case of about 30-40 percent of 
"rejects" are offered surface work to which lower rates of pay apply. Surface 
basic rates in 1976 were 64.4 percent of underground rates. The test thus 
fulfills a critical "allocative function". Whilst the effect on productivity 
compared to "indiscriminate placement" would be difficult to calculate, it 
should not be considered unimportant. In times of "shortage" or periodic 
crisis, criteria normally adopted are relaxed. They may also be qualified in 
the case of recruits from certain areas; e.g. the diminutive size of certain 
Botswana workers has not deterred the MLO's interest in their labour supply. 
Such an approach provides the MLO with a minimum degree of flexibility. 
The weight criterion has also been found by CM researchers to closely cor-
relate with maximum oxygen intake, which determines the underground labourers' 
capacity for physical work.1' Oxygen intake rates of 2.5 litres/minute are 
reckoned to be needed to carry out tasks such as shovelling, tramming, timber 
transporting, and so on. On the basis of one sample, CM researchers found 
an intake level of 2.24 litres/minute in 80 percent of persons below 110 lbs. 
in weight. Even with "normal" weight gain (of around 7 lbs. per contract) as 
usually occurs in the first few months of contract, 66 percent would still not 
meet the requisite performance criterion. 
The age criterion of 18 years has been set under the Bantu Labour Regulations 
Act. However, this writer has personally viewed contract forms in Wenela's 
1 o 
Salisbury office for contractees below that age. In practice few Africans 
in supplier States have birth certificates. Other subjective criteria are 
thus used. From data, CM research has deduced that the average 18 year-old 
African "should weigh" 124 lbs. and, after allowing for a normal statistical 
distribution, should not fall under 110 lbs. This latter index is thus used 
as a proxy for age. In 1975 it was estimated by Hudson that the average age 
19 
was 32 years. 
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The economics of labourers' health and the equation with productivity -
given that recruitment has by this stage involved the company in a fixed 
cost- is of great importance to the industry. During contract, health is 
20 21 
regularly monitored; ill persons are sent to hospital for recuperation; 
large sums are outlayed on medical research; and attention is given to trends 
and the effects of health conditions on labour productivity. This attention 
also embraces a monitoring of accident incidence, attendant hospitalisation 
and resultant shift losses. 
The costs to the industry of an unhealthy, accident-prone or under-strength 
labour force manifest in a number of ways and not only in shift losses, e.g. 
higher hospital costs, spread effects in the case of contagious diseases, 
increased compensation liability, etc. of. admissions to hospital for illness 
in the 1971-74 period, 22 percent were for Upper Respiratory Infection (an 
"expensive" disease) and another 10 percent involved (high-cost) surgical 
22 
treatment. These costs cannot be insured against, nor can immunisation be 
effective in these quarters. Indeed, in data provided to the writer by the 
Medical Research Adviser of the Human Resources Laboratory, in 1974 alone 
1.5 million shift losses were recorded from a labour force of 394,000 workers, 
926,000 being for illness - the rest a consequence of accident. Since the 
potential shift level for that year was approximately 100 mi 11 ion shifts (Cal-
culated on the basis of 250 shifts per annum per worker and after allowing 
time for training and acclimatisation), the loss was not insubstantial. On 
the basis of labour securement cost alone, it can be calculated at about 
R400,000; in terms of the value of the proceeds of lost production it would 
be many times this amount. 
CM health policy has thus been firmly based on profits considerations. Its 
medical examination process has been an integral and scientific component of 
this policy. 
ACCLIMATISATION: "THE HOUSE OF SATAN" AND THE MAXIMISATION 
OF WORK CAPACITY 
The medical tests completed, and the division of labour between African workers 
effectively designated, recruitees move to the point of production. 
Here a third medical examination is conducted, again, so it is reported in 
• 93 
some cases, with the requirement of mass public stripping. Injections are 
also given for purposes of immunisation. 
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Usually, too, a period of time is spent on training, viz. learning the 1ingua 
franca of the "mining complex" (fanakolo), receiving safety instructions, be-
coming acquainted with the "rules of the mine", and being subjected, accord-
ing to some observers, to a certain degree of ideological conditioning in 
respect of the inculcation of pre-defined "work relationships and behaviour 
?4 
patterns. 
All this has been preceded by an allotment process according to expressed 
individual mine demands for MLO labour supplies. "Volitional options" do 
not play a part in this process and allocation is largely a function of 
certain "ethnic mix" requirements of mines, periodic demands and localised 
shortages. 
The most significant on-site procedure is "acclimatisation" for the group 
pre-determined as underground labourers, roughly 300,000 in number each year. 
Ramahapu, for instance, has described the procedure as "innocent and recom-
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mendable but if we probe deeper ... it is a device of social control". 
Its objective is to accustom workers to heavy labour under the onerous heat 
conditions which exist underground. A two-stage process, the first is of 
five days'duration and the second 0f three days - being restricted to those 
who only go underground occasionally, e.g. African Personnel Officers, and 
those who work where ventilation is good, e.g. policemen. 
Acclimatisation consists of trotting up and down onto a step about one foot 
above floor level, the height being adjusted to one's weight. Stepping rates 
vary from 1560 lbs./min. on the first day to 3120 Ibs./min. at the end, while 
the process takes place for four hours at a time throughout the period in a 
room (known as "The House of Satan") heated to 34°C with a wind velocity of 
100 ft./min. Stopping leads to the penalty of re-starting. Ramahapu claims 
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the process is used to inculcate "docility and submissiveness". Whether so 
or not, it does appear to be widely resented by workers, especially when work 
is also required immediately thereafter. And, it has a stabilisation component 
attached to it in that, in order to avoid acclimatisation, workers will appa-
rently stay longer on the mine as well as return earlier after contract expi-
ration because, if they do so, acclimatisation is restricted to the shorter 
second stage. 
The significance of acclimatisation for African miners is appreciated when 
it is noted that it applies to the bulk of recruits, especially foreign wor-
kers. South African miners have for many years tended to avoid underground 
jobs (see here Table 4). On gold mines about 20-25 precent of jobs are on 
the surface. Qi coal mines, the average proportion reaches around 30 percent. 
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On some deep-level gold mines the proportion of underground to surface 
labourers may be even higher than indicated in Table 4. The costs in terms 
of deterioration of health and loss of productivity thus arising from in-
adequate acclimatisation can thus be considerable. 
An important subsidiary "allocative function" is fulfilled by acclimatisation, 
viz. that of defining maximum depth levels appropriate to various underground 
workers. This provides another example of sub-system optimisation in the 
division of labour and job-allocation process on the mines. 
The importance of acclimatisation has not been lost to the CM which has spent 
years of research and millions of rands investigating the issue. 
"Heat Studies" have been a major focus of research initiatives. Such research 
was behind the development of on-surface acclimatisation facilities which en-
abled its integration with job-technique learning, safety courses and "language 
familiarisation". The personnel and facilities of the South African Institute 
for Medical Research are harnessed in these endeavours. 
.1 
Research has covered a wide range of issues, most connected with productivity 
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considerations, for example, the following: (l) the extent to which the 
avaiability of drinking water underground will affect physiological condition; 
(2) factors determining the incidence of heat stroke like the percentage of 
novices in an intake, the intensity of acclimatisation, the length of shift 
(it increases up to 6J hours after the start of a shift, the incidence rising 
with shovelling and tramming and the transfer of men from light/low temperature 
to hard/high temperature jobs); (3) loss of acclimatisation because of absence 
as a result of sickness or leave (30-40 percent of the effect being lost with-
in the first week and 80-90 percent after 6 weeks); (4) effectiveness of 
acclimatisation procedures; (5) appropriate procedures for (the cheaper pro-
cess of) surface acclimatisation; (6) the increased work capacity due to (the 
now demonstrated superior procedure of) surface acclimatisation (the proportion 
of men who could be allocated to "hard work such as shovelling and tramming 
rock" rising from 14.6 percent to 29.6 percent as a result of surface pro-
cedures and the proportion who could only do "light work" falling from 21,1 
percent to 7.4 percent); (7) minimum periods required to effect acclimatisation 
(this shown to be 4 hours for 9 days (in 1967) on surface procedures whereas 
it used to be 5 hours for 12 days on underground procedures); (8) the accli-
matisation of underweight workers (i.e. below 50 kg), even though men with 
oxygen intake levels below 2.5 litres/min. should not even undertake accli-
matisation (indeed only 11 percent of such men are capable of "hard work"); 
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(9) the reduction of time for acclimatisation; (10) age and heat stroke 
(older men being more susceptible - and for which reason the proportion of 
men over 40 years is less than 10 percent); (11) age/weight relationships 
and work capacity, showing that some of the subjects of a sample who were of 
a weight less than 46 kgs and an age in excess of 40 years had a maximum 
oxygen intake level high enough to permit them to work moderately hard under-
ground; (12) the optimum division of labour and individual allocation (there-
by enabling those workers with "low oxygen intake levels" to be put onto low-
paid and light surface jobs like sweeping, so maintaining overall productivity); 
(13) the identification of apparently "heat intolerant" men and modified ac-
climatisation procedures in respect of them; (14) the design of micro-climate 
jackets (in lieu of conventional refridgeration on certain slopes); and (15) 
the effects on productivity and heat stroke risk of a longer working shift 
(a matter which has become important in the light of a prospective 5-day week, 
one finding being that "good supervision" is critical for the last hour). 
One oyerriding conclusion can be made from the above, viz. while the effect 
of "managed acclimatisation" or productivity and profits has been and is like-
ly to be vital to the industry, the requirements are such as to significantly 
pre-pattern labour demand considerations, making essential the existence for 
the industry of a "relative surplus" of "eligible workers". 
THE CONTROL OF LABOUR-TIME ON THE MINES 
Once workers are involved in production, it is essential for the mine to 
maximise the volume of labour-time supplied and to ensure optimum utilisation 
of available time. 
These demands call for a sophisticated managerial structure, the essence of 
which has been built up in the "mining complex" over decades. It might be 
inaccurate to say this aspect of management had been "developed to a fine art" 
but only because, on the contrary, it has become an increasingly "scientific 
element" in overall managerial strategy. 
The major mining houses and the CM now have fully developed personnel depart-
ments. AAC, for instance, has had a personnel consultant since the end of 
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1972. The essence of this corporation1s successful and much changing stra-
tegy has been crystallised by its Employment Practices Committee since March 
of that year. Similar structures have existed in the De Beers Group, to 
which it is "related". Intricate job evaluation exercises have been carried pq out as well as other investigations. The centralised character of the 
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mining house system permits significant economies of scale in this quarter 
as a single carefully articulated set of policies can become easily and 
rapidly translated into each corporate subsidiary of the group. The power 
of personnel executives is thus not to be under-rated. 
In fact, concern with labour strategy of this kind is not a new phenomenon, 
30 
as a key industry spokesman W.D. Wilson has correctly reported. Work in 
this area was begun in 1950; surveys were commissioned in the 1960s; and 
recent initiatives have much expanded the scope of monitoring and analysis. 
This work, together with that of the CM, provides an essential underpinning 
for managerial control of labour-time maximisation and utilisation in the 
"mining complex." 
The control of on-mine labour time broadly covers: (1) the "selective adjust-
ment" of the composition of the labour force; (2) stabilisation policies; 
(3) control of the "working week"; and (4) the minimisation of shift losses. 
"Selective adjustment" of labour force composition may take various forms. 
Some are extensions of more generalised industry policies. Thus "absconders", 
i.e. persons breaking contract, are selected out for penalties. Usually, wor-
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kers away from work for 6 continuous days are instantly discharged. If they 
attempt, at a later stage, to return to other mining employment, they may be 
caught in the records system. Third offenders are "blacklisted", the penalty 
being the denial of employment. Alternatively, some MLO officials even give 
"third offenders" a chance, but require them to pay their own transport to 
and from the mine, a receipt for which after contract expiration will entitle 
the worker to a refund. In these ways, stable labour is encouraged within the 
vicissitudes of the migrant system. With a growing element of urban recruit-
ment, levels of abscondment have risen and policies for control in this area 
have become more important. 
Another "selective adjustment" policy relates to the "weeding out" of "trouble-
makers". Ramahapu, for instance, has claimed that elements of victimisation 
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do exist on mines, for the purposes of social control. Policies of "instant 
discharge" may be seen as a means pour encourager les autres and as a mecha-
nism to discourage "loafing". The mines, for their part, view it as a legiti-
mate defence of their interests in the face of contractual violation. 
Perhaps the most important policies, however, relate to# the stabilisation of 
labourers. Should labour-time provided per contract increase or should the 
efficiency of utilisation of such time increase or, indeed, should the average 
contract period lengthen, so in a related measure will the demand for labour 
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be met by fewer workers and lower fixed recruitment costs. By implication, 
because of the rising South African component of African labour supplies, 
this will translate into a reduced demand for foreign workers. This appears 
a net result if not an objective of stabilisation strategy. 
Stabilisation policies designed to secure these objectives take various forms. 
In effect, they take account of the transitional necessity of "differential 
stabilisation" of the various segments of the labour supply as well as struc-
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tural constraints existing at the present juncture.00 The necessity of stabi-
lisation within the confines of the continuation of a slowly-changing migrant 
labour system is explicitly recognised within the mining industry. The Pre-
sidential Address contained in the 1975 CM Annual Report, in commenting on 
newly introduced stabilisation incentives, notes pointedly: "(These) will 34 
enable us to ensure greater stability within the migratory pattern". The 
strategy had even been enunciated the year before: "Inevitably the bulk of 
mining labour will remain migratory for many years to come but it is hoped 
that a core of stable South African employees can be built up on longer life 
mines:"35 
The implementation of such a strategy has obvious implications for foreign 
labour demand and supplier States. For individual supplier States, demand 
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might be affected by inter-country variations in average contract length. 
Further, the amendment of contracts by the Gold Producers' Committee in 1972 
to relate them to calendar months rather than shifts worked - the previous 
basis - has enabled the introduction of 6, 9, and 12-month contracts as well as 37 
4-month sojourns for workers under the AVS. This "contractual flexibility" 
enables better "tapping" of supplies by more closely articulating contractual 
opportunities with supply conditions. Significantly, though, the greatest 
standardisation of contract relates to the market for foreign labour supply. 
The need for more variation has grown more acute with an increase in the South 38 
African labour content. Yet nearly 75 percent of South African recruits are 
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reported to return to the mines, the balance dropping out of the system. 
Perceiving this point, the CM has investigated and adopted procedures for 
lengthening stays, providing inducements to early returnees as well as "stream-
lining" re-entry to avoid duplication of training costs and acclimatisation 
requirements. The growing core of stabilised workers - many possibly urbanised 
or landless with more education - is largely a localised supply which the CM o 
wishes to see as the "more skilled" component of the total labour supply. 
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The advantages of this to employers is obvious, especially in an industry like 
gold which is prone to rapid price fluctuations. Recessionary conditions could 
thus relatively easily be accommodated by adjustment at the (foreign) unskilled 
level combined with re-deployment of the (local) semi-skilled workers, the 
latter thereby being readily available for up-grading during expansionary 
times. It would however be inaccurate to believe that semi-skilled or higher-
paid workers are necessarily stable vis-a-vis mining. Mauer, for instance, 
sampled "Boss Boy" contract experience in 1972 and found that while 58 per-
cent had had 3 or more contracts behind them, a "tapering off" of experience 
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occurred after 6.7 contracts. 
One constraint on the rapid increase in settled labour has been the long-
standing government restriction requiring that no more than 3percent of married 
workers be located permanently at the mine. In the 1950s the mines had 
pushed for a minimum 10 percent level, but this had been refused by the then 
Minister of Native Affairs (Dr H.F. Verwoerd), the lower level being stipu-
lated (so the mines argue) for "political reasons".41 Indeed, for various 
reasons, not adequately yet explained, the mines had (by 1975) not even 
reached this 3 percent level. 
Other stabilisation initiatives have centred around wage adjustment strategy, 
higher levels permitting (though not guaranteeing) greater stability. Also 
on the payments side, moves towards monthly payment and pension or provident 
fund provisions have tended towards the same effect. However, these two changes 
are not yet widely dispersed in the industry. Reliance is thus still placed 
on an ancilliary effect of the Deferred Pay Scheme for foreign workers. The 
deductions are paid "at home", at the expiration of contract. Breach of con-
tract can thus involve the worker in forfeiture of a considerable element of 
earnings as usually 60 percent of basic rates are compulsorily deferred in 
the case of foreign workers. 
The tendency of management to want to lengthen the working day exists in the 
mining industry as in others. However, the basic constraint of maximum work 
capacity and work-time underground, at inordinate heat levels and high wet-
y 
bulb temperatures,!imits opportunities. (Nonetheless, the CM has researched 
the implications of extension to shift lengths). 
Consequently, managerial wishes to extend working-time have been expressed in 
the insistent maintenance of a six-day week in the industry. Opposition to 
this scheme has primarily arisen from strongly unionised white labour interests 
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which have sought the generalised introduction of a 5-day week. The issue 
has been "on the boil" from at least 1970 when the CM noted its objections, 
saying that "with the existing labour pattern (it) would call for heavy 
initial capital expenditure and would result in a sharp increase in working 
40 
costs." In particular, it would be necessary to maintain and operate more 
work places, increase hoist capacity and provide additional storage bins 
for ore if production was not to be impaired. Further, it would "create", 
or more properly aggravate, the "skilled labour shortage". 
With recessionary conditions linked to balance of payments problems and a 
decline in the gold price after 1974, the CM's position for not introducing 
the 5-day week has in some ways been strengthened. However, organised 
unionism has had powerful political leverage in the matter and has been 
able to secure agreement to the scheme in principle. Because the quid 
pro quos of the "deal" have not been fully struck or enunciated, it appears 
that its introduction may lead to some further wage stratification between 
African labourers and other semi-skilled workers (e.g. artisans aides, non-
certified operatives, etc.). The prospect of it reducing African earnings 
has not, it would seem, been publicly raised. 
Attempts to extend labour-time and stabilise labour supply through the mini-
misation of shift losses have concentrated on various areas. The basic re-
quirement has been that miners, in fulfilling contracts, complete a mini-
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mum shift load in a year. The promotion of safety on mines can be viewed 
as contributing in this area. Fewer accidents mean fewer shift losses and 
lower working costs for the mine. Minimisation of hospitalisation rates 
has the same effect as does the cutting down of the duration of stay in 
hospital. 
RAISING THE "QUALITY COMPONENT" OF LABOUR-TIME 
Various factors are leading towards a restructuring of demand and the need 
for a larger relative component of labour-time provided in the form of 
semi-skilled labour: mechanisation policy; the phasing out of older mines 
from the industry (these generally being more labour-intensive in character); 
and the development of sub-sectors (e.g. copper and zinc) in which open pit 
works are possible and which can be more easily mechanised than deep-level 
gold mines. 
To meet this supply need, the CM has had various options. It has chosen 
not to rely too heavily on State provision of technical training and has 
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itself begun to invest more substantially in on-the-job and on-mine training 
facilities. It has also become more selective in its intake policy. New 
recruitment areas, e.g. Rhodesia, now supply a largely literate labour supply 
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with a number of years educational experience. As a consequence, today 
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about 61 percent of workers are literate. Most importantly, the CM has 
its own "skilling" programme. Training is now provided for team leaders, 
technicians and artisans' aides. 
One objective here is the reduction of labour costs through the substitution 
of production systems requiring more lower-cost semi-skilled than higher-cost 
supervisory labour. A pre-requisite is of course an adaptable "floating 
colour bar", something which has been more difficult to achieve in practice 
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than perhaps the Chamber had envisaged in the past. In the absence of 
such formal re-division of labour, the industry has sought and obtained a 
reclassification of artisanal work. 
The restructuring of demand has ominous implications for supplier States 
"locked" into the contract labour export syndrome. In some, educational 
outlays are too small to produce a highly educated labour force. If allowed 
to emigrate en masse, such a skills exodus would create domestic shortages 
with attendant disruption of development plans in the form of retarded local-
isation policies, higher wages for some of those who remain,thereby skewing 
income distribution patterns and deficiencies. On the other hand, those 
recruited will tend to exclude not only the aged, the infirm or those of 
marginally "unsatisfactory health", but also increasingly the unskilled and/ 
or uneducated. All this has been made more certain by the demonstrably 
higher wages pertaining to mine work in South Africa compared to "opportunity 
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costs" facing prospective migrants in supplier States. 
WAGES AND SUPPLY: LOCAL AND FOREIGN 
Wage levels and rates directly affect labour supply. In the case of the 
mines, rising minimum and actual wages have since 1970 radically altered 
the "labour reserves" upon which producers can draw. Incursions into "tra-
ditional supply zones", of competitors to mining capital in both South Africa 
and peripheral States, have been largely a function of restructured wages 
and earning opportunities. The factors behind these wage trends, and data 
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on wage rates, have been examined elsewhere. Despite the fact that higher 
real wages have caused wage cost/total expenditure ratios to rise, for the 
industry as a whole, this does not necessarily imply a higher labour cost, 
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since the changes in the ratio must be set against changes in productivity 
associated with the re-defined levels. There is no easily defined and 
wholly acceptable measure of productivity change but crude indices, like 
metric tons of treated gold per employee over time, indicate that produc-
49 
tivity has probably risen in the 1970-75 period. 
In any event, the maintenance of productivity levels could be considered 
"good performance" for older mines in which ore-body grades are falling or 
in which access to ore is becoming progressively more difficult for man and 
machine alike. And, in the final analysis, there is no simple, or possibly 
even acceptable, method of disembodying causes "in order to apportion changes 
in productivity levels between different "factors". 
The quest for productivity increase has not been a random one. This has been 
evident in the CM research programme which has embraced the following inter 
alia: (1) assessments of maximum work levels per shift and motivation for 
maximal physical work (including endurance capacity, work conditions and 
work output, the work capacity of "light-weight Bantu recruits" and weight/ 
work capacity differences of urban and rural recruits); (2) the mechanical 
efficiency of shovellers (it being found that narrow stopes limit movement and 
cause a high energy expenditure); (3) the probable effects of an extra hour 
of work (it being found that the decline in work towards the end of a shift 
is an important safety factor and that the returns to an extra hour worked 
would be the lowest of the shift); and (4) gang productivity and variations. 
It has not only been in the sphere of productivity though where wage rises 
have had significance. They have in effect guaranteed the CM's affiliates a 
larger share of the local supply of labour quite apart from being a strategic 
necessity for local recruitment and the establishment of hegemony amongst 
employers of unskilled labour inside supplier States. Indeed, at the present 
level (of around R101 cash and R40 "in kind" on average in January, 1977), 
there is much likelihood that such dominance will be maintained in the medium-
term future. For this, as well as profit and cost considerations, it can be 
expected that the rate of wage increase will now diminish, being more attuned 
to the wage rise needed to secure the strategically defined South African com-
ponent desired by CM/MLO planners.50 The growth of unemployment in South 
Africa makes this task easier at lower wage levels than it would be in times 
of "full employment". Of course, too, technical transformations, eventually 
enabling higher productivity, could themselves also play a part here by tend-
ing to reduce the demand for labour. In as much as foreign "labour reserves" 
are first affected, supplier States will reap a disproportionate share of the 
adverse consequences. 
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SOCIAL CONTROL AS A NECESSITY? 
Whilst the conditions of labour and subsistence found on the mines do not 
only relate to foreign workers, they are sufficiently important to bear men-
tion in regard to the question of the use made of labour-time and control 
exercise over non-work periods between shifts. In a sense, the tough regime 
of mine work - of constant, regular shifts of hard labouring - probably 
makes more difficult the social control over labourers when also low-paid. 
Even with higher wages, such a "problem" remains - if only because of the 
character of the compound system and the conditions of life it defines. 
Extra-compound conditions - social, political and otherwise - most likely 
aggravate these tensions. 
Recent studies have focussed on these various internal compound conditions 
which, despite higher wages now compared to (say) 1970, remain for the most 
part structurally unaltered. Food, although medically-assessed for nutri-
tional balance, is reportedly "mass produced" in an unattractive form and in 
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an uncongenial setting. The compound system of male-dominated "labour 
batteries" still dominates every aspect of mine life. Entrances and exits are 
normally "guarded". During disturbances even personal movement may be circum-
scribed. Housing - except for some mines - remains founded upon a basis of 
52 
ethnic and lineage division and hence a source of intra-worker factionalism. 
The "Boss Boy" or Induna system still operates to mediate worker/management 
relations, though in some groups incipient, probably ineffective "works 
committees" function. But these nowhere approach trade unions or the mini-
mum requirement of democratically articulated representation. Mine violence 
is still prone to erupt without much warning as to time or place, and to last 
for an uncertain duration. The "rapport" between workers and supervisers re-
mains largely cemented to "traditional" stereotypes of submissiveness found 
in the "baas/boy" syndrome. Resistance, the organisation of labour or criti-
cism is largely frowned upon if not seriously dealt with in one form or an-
other. And, all this despite a massive "Humen Relations" effort in research 53 
and redefinition of policy. 
It would seem then that the social controls typical of the past remain enough 
in evidence today to still warrant some support for the view that "extra-
economic" measures remain necessary to production conditions and social re-
lations in the "mining complex." Reformism thus far does not yet appear to 
have "cracked the nut" at the core of the system of "primitive accumulation" 
with which the mines have for so long been associated. 
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DISCHARGE, "DISPLACEMENT" AND THE "RECYCLING" OF LABOUR 
It is an axiomatic consequence of contractual arrangements for mine employment 
that discharge rates may be effectively "planned for" and entered into the 
calculus of labour strategy. Policy on discharge is thus as important as is 
policy on recruitment. Equally so is the policy of (foreign) labour "dis-
placement" which accompanies discharge. Less within the total control of 
mining capital, however, is the pattern of "recycling" of labour supplies, 
viz. the recruitment of the same workers on a continuous basis over a (often 
varying) series of contracts. But the CM is able to influence this pattern. 
It is to a policy of trying to ensure "optimum recycling patterns" that the 
mines have now turned their attention. In theory, it would not necessarily 
be the cheapest solution to "recycle" into employment all those workers pre-
viously discharged. Some will be getting "too old", others "less healthy" 
or, for some other reason, may no longer offer the same potential work capa-
city. But, logically from the point of view of mining capital, it rs cheaper 
to recruit "experienced hands", especially if the return to employment closely 
follows upon the previous discharge, if only to reduce time needed for accli-
matisation requirements. Inducements to discharged labourers to encourage 
their return thus seek to mould supply patterns around or close to this op-
timum perspective. 
II MLO/CM FOREIGN AFRICAN LABOUR SUPPLY STRATEGY IN THE 1970S 
Beyond mere policy lie strategic considerations which, in the case of the 
CM/MLO, can be distinguished by the fact that they are largely concerned with 
labour supply issues outside of the "mining complex", dealing with the fun-
damental cornerstones upon which policy rests. Strategy is moreover con-
cerned primarily with longer term perspectives, principally those focussed 
on critical high-change areas. They are also issue which usually overtly 
touch upon social, economic, political and ideological factors. 
THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF INTERNATIONAL LABOUR SUPPLIES 
The wheels of the labour supply system require to be "oiled" by political and 
diplomatic accords. The statements of mining house chiefs almost always con-
tain sections dealing with political events - whether tfiey be on race relations, 
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stability or detente. The CM maintains an extensive "guest list" each year. 
Notables have of late included Dr H. Banda, the Minister of Mines from Rho-
desia, the South African Prime Minister, officials from labour ministries of 
various supplier States, the Ma'lawian Minister of Finance, and editors of 
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newspapers. Indeed, as leading mining industry spokesman Mr H.F. Oppenheimer 
has said in recent times, the success of recent detente policies has a 
vital bearing on the mining industry. "Behind the scene" contacts have also 
been vital, exchanges taking place directly and through third parties with 
the Malawian President (since the withdrawal of labour supplies), Frelimo 
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(in the post-coup period) and the MPLA in Angola. Indeed, this is "stan-
dard policy" for the MLO/CM which seeks wherever possible to maintain "good 
relations" not only with supplier States but also potential suppliers, as e.g. 
Zambia, Tanzania and Angola. 
Internally, the political connections have probably been even more overt. 
"Homeland" leaders, e.g. Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, have been industry guests 
56 
and appear in films shown to potential recruits in supplier areas. Gifts 
have been made to various "Homelands" e.g. the Transkei on the attainment of 
"independence". This has really only been an extension of previous policy, 
e.g. the K2000 donation in 1971 on the occasion of the conferment of Life 
Presidency on Dr H. Banda for "the establishment of the Kamuzu Foundation in 
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Malawi". These, too, are over and above the close links the industry keeps 
with the local power elite, its officials and key groups. 
Just how necessary such political connections have been is difficult to 
assess. The industry at least thinks them not unimportant. 
THE MLO BUDGET AND OBJECTIVES (FOR 1977) 
The mechanics of international labour supply strategy are each year crystal-
lised into a "budget" and set of objectives for the MLO organisational 
apparatus. 
The objectives are established not only in terms of broad principle but also 
in "budgeted" volume terms, i.e. the numbers of recruitees to be obtained from 
each State and area. "Targetted" totals are closely matched to expected pro-
duction needs as assessed in the light of mineral price trends, expansion in 
capacity because of investment expected to come "on-stream" and other relevant 
considerations. The function of the plan is to inform key officials and 
provide a workable guideline for MLO's own investment/dis-investment decisions. 
The MLO Budget and Objectives For 1977 provides a good indicator of the plan-
ning perspective and strategy of labour supply considered at the international 
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level. The plan was, in brief, to: 
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1. Recruit from and maintain relations with as many supplier sources 
as possible: 
(a) increase the proportion of South African/Transkeian re-
cruits from 171,000 to 198,500 and from the BLS States 
from 118,500 to 139,000 (i.e. from 46 percent to 50 per-
cent for South Africa/Transkei and from 32 percent to 
35 percent for BLS) 
(b) balance the mix of foreign workers and maintain supply 
potential at the 110 percent level 
(c) where possible maintain relations with previous suppliers, 
i.e. Angola, Tanzania and Zambia 
(d) apply country limits: Mocambique 30,000; Rhodesia 25,000; 
Malawi 20,000 
(e) maintain cordial relations through donations policy, 
visits of Homeland leaders, public relations and films 
of the industry. 
2. Increase the stability of the black labour force by: 
(a) reducing wastage and turnover 
(b) maintaining "job spread" over the various categories 
(c) better selection 
(d) linking research on labour to industry needs 
(e) promoting industrial relations 
(f) standardising agreements 
(g) adjusting activities to reduce seasonal fluctuations. 
3. Improve recruiting information and methods (e.g. by regionalising 
depots). 
4. Minimise recruiting costs and obtain both acceptable capitation 
fees and a variegated intake mix. 
u 
5. Obtain a total recruitment level of 466,000 workers (1976: 
453,000). 
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Various principles underlie the plan. Firstly, the MLO seeks a "poly-
valent" approach in that it tries to maximise the number of supplier States 
and distribute aggregate foreign demand across theni as a residual after 
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domestic recruitment targets have been set. Secondly, the Transkei is 
to be treated as an independent supplier State, but one with a "special 
relationship" to South Africa. Thirdly, the MLO sets quota levels on sup-
plier States, for various reasons. Fourthly, strategic-cum-political. factors 
play a major role in the supply/demand determining process. 
The plan is also accompanied by detailed costing and estimates of past and 
projected expenditures. All in all, it provides the essence of a highly 
articulated strategy. 
STRATEGY ON "SUPPLY VOLUME" 
The securement of required supply volume requires consideration by MLO of a 
number of shperes of operation. 
The'essential underpinning of the system rests in its negotiated inter-State 
contracts with BLS, Mocambique (stretching back to the Mocambique Convention 
in 1928 ), Angola (1973), Rhodesia (in 1974), and a "labour treaty" with the 
Transkei; informal ties with Namibia as well as local "Homelands"; and a pro-
spectively viable but at present broken contract with Malawi. Further in the 
background are old "stomping grounds" such as Zambia (notably its Western Pro-
vince) and Tanzania. There are formal agreements between the supplier State 
and the government in South Africa; but the latter more-or-less act as the 
CM proxy in these matters. 
Foreign labour supply strategy is closely influenced by the success of the 
MLO's domestic policy. Apart from raising the content from local and rural 
labour reserves, the focus has recently been on three initiatives: the re-
cruitment of women, urban recruitment, and the securement of a rising "off-
take level" from the white farms. 
The employment of African women is not only a local supply-fulfilling policy. 
It is also a policy of a cost-cutting character. The numbers have risen 
from 235 to 801 in the 1974-76 period.60 These are mostly but not exclus-
ively service jobs (teachers, switchboard operators, secretaries, etc). 
The CM/MLO interest in employing women stems from two factors: they are 
a 
largely non-migrant, and hence more stable, and supply much exceeds present 
demand. 
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Urban recruitment has followed the government relaxation of restrictions 
on the requirement that after contract all workers had to be returned to 
"their homeland". Now 6, 9 and 12-month contracts can be offered to urban 
61 
based workers. At present (1976), there are only about 1000 so employed. 
However, with rising urban unemployment numbers could well increase sub-
stantially in a short period. 
Recruitment from white farms has always been a contentious issue, the South 
African Agricultural Union (SAAU) and its members resolutely opposing such 
incursions into their "protected" reserves of labour. Recruitment in these 
areas has in the past been controlled through the issue of Labour Agent's 
Licenses to individuals. Since 1974, according to the Financial Mail, the 
fip 
NRC has applied for 200 such licenses. By May 1975 an agreement had been 
reached between the CM and SAAU (with governemnt mediation) over such re-co 
cruitment. MLO agents could recruit but not "entice" labour away from 
farms. More recently, the policy has been restricted and now the SAAU and 
the ,CM are monitoring the effects of such recruitment in four districts to 
ascertain more precisely the degree of underemployment on such farms. The 
SAAU view is that there is litte, whilst the CM claims a massive degree of 64 
underemployment exists. 
Labour Bureaux officials at the very least appear to be assisting the SAAU/ 
farmer lobby in certain areas, e.g. the Free State, through stopping young 
blacks who seek to leave for mine work by the non-issue of the requisite 
documentation.55 Although the mines see the developing farm labour surpluses 
as an important prospective source - especially if "pianned-for" agricultural 
mechanisation proceeds - there is little they can do in the interim, pending 
a basic political decision about allowing more "free competition" for labour 
supplies within rural South Africa. There is little doubt, should this 
come to pass, that the greater level of mine wages vis-a-vis farm earnings 
will "siphon-off" many thousands of Africans from the soil to the stope face. 
Such a development could well lead to a rapid rise in the proportion of 
South Africans on the mines and provide the basis for a further diminution in 
the relative demand for foreign labour. Indeed, diminished employment growth 
rates in capitalist agriculture, combined with natural growth of the on-farm 
population, could well make this one prospect realised sooner rather than 
later. 
* 
SUPPLY/DEMAND SYNCHRONISATION 
Because, too, marked seasonal fluctuations affect labour supply, strategy 
has to account for means to ensure "full complements" in the industry as well 
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as on individual mines. This is an extremely difficult "synchronising pro-
blem" which the MLO attempt to overcome by obtaining and retaining a "re-
serve cushion" of recruits (of the order of 10 percent over estimated actual 
demand) within the "mining complex". As long as labour recruitment costs 
are relatively low, such a policy can be afforded. The problem of ensuring 
availability in periods of declining recruitment, however, remains. Thus 
special attention is given to such matters by MLO officials. 
The relaxing of recruitment criteria (regarding age, health and skil1-status) 
is also another mechanism used to overcome "seasonal shortages". 
Further, because of the more general excess of surface complement over under-
ground requirements, room also exists for job re-allocation to play some role 
in this direction as well. For example, in mid-1976 underground strength was 
97.82 percent of complement while surface strength was 107.92 percent.66 Of 
course, by November/December the situation is usually more aggravated and 
substitution of the total "surface surplus", even if it were feasible, would 
not overcome the "seasonal underground shortage". 
Various factors have contributed to this "shortage", more recent pressures 
being: a higher proportion of South African workers (whose access to land, 
if it is held or there is a usufruct, is more easily maintained or who can 
take shorter contracts); and the absolute and relative decline in supplies 
of Mocambican workers (who not only have a high average contract length but 
whose "seasonal inflow" has in the past acted as a "stabilising mechanism", 
because the East Coast inflow has tended to peak when South Africa and other 
supplier State outflows were rising well above inflow levels). 
The concern with a "seasonal" fall off in supplies, to the extent it arises, 
is clearly rooted in the anticipated adverse effects on production and rates 
of utilisation of capacity of stopes as well as fixed capital. But, it is 
nonetheless difficult to maintain the precision the industry claims about the 
accuracy of its professed "seasonal shortage". Measures of "required com-
plement" must in the end be based on a theoretical "composite index" of 
physical capacity, i.e. forms of labour required per stope, per superviser, 
per machine type, etc. This can seldom be 100 percent reliable, consistent 
or accurate. And, moreover, given the experience of the 1974-75 massive out-
flow of Malawians, and the only marginal dip recorded jn output,there is room 
to doubt that a more reduced and predictable "shortage" such as a regular 
seasonal one, which affects suppliers much less on average, can be considered 
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so serious for overall production. Indeed, it may be worth positing a 
different perspective, viz. that the temporary shortage experienced could 
be regarded as a necessary concommitant of a low-wage policy under conditions 
of migrant labour and hence only a marginal but essential cost for the system. 
The wage rises which might be needed to fully offset it would most likely 
have to apply "across the board" and hence would be expensive in net terms. 
In any event, if some stopes are not in use, it does not necessarily mean 
they are "unproductive", lying fallow as it were. Time is also needed for 
repair work, for maintenance etc. And, labour allocated to non-directly pro-
ductive activities, e.g. the expansion of capacity, could be employed in 
directly productive tasks in such periods. It must further be remembered 
that the Xmas period is generally a slack time for many industries and a 
time during which many skilled/white miners will probably also take holidays. 
As the CM/MLO seek to balance supply and demand, their concern is with both 
"too much" and "too little" recruited labour at any one point in time. It 
is because the phenomenon of "too little" labour" does directly impinge on 
output and costs that it receives the attention it does. 
STRATEGY ON R & D, LABOUR SUPPLY, CONTROL AND PRODUCTIVITY 
The Human Resources Laboratory (HRL) of the CM - which is concerned with 
statistics, productivity studies, organisation and methods, training and 
psychological research - and its six associated research divisions (in 
technology, environmental control, engineering, metallurgy, mining systems 
and research services) have emerged as a key element in the articulation of 
future labour strategy as well as providing for assessment of past practice. 
These are part of a massive Research and Development effort by the CM on 
behalf of its affiliates and, in the event, non-affiliates. 
In part, expansion of work in this field is a response to the labour crises 
of the 1970s. First indications of the new approach came in 1974, when the 
Chamber announced its 10-year R150 million programme for R & D . In the 
1974-5 period alone the CM Research budget rose from R5.2 million to R9.9 
million. The programme's objectives are multifarious but include as key areas: 
better utilisation of labour supply and productivity growth; greater mecha-
nisation; lower working costs; safer conditions with higher earnings prospects; 
longer 1ife-expectancey for miners; better planning; and larger profits. 
There is little doubt that significant changes will result from this initiative. 
With a sizeable budget, the HRL has been able to operate with a large staff 
of social scientists (two-thirds of the 55 posts in 1976 being filled by gra-
duates). Through its Research Advisory Committee, it centralises the use of 
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the best research manpower in the industry. Further, with computer facili-
ties - onto which will in future be programmed a "Central Record of 
Service" for each miner who passes through the MLO's network - the industry 
will be in a vastly superior control position compared to the pre-1975 era. 
(Since 1971 the CM has been working on the project of establishing a "data 
bank" for raw data gathered in the past). 
The research effort to date has been in many areas, most closely connected 
with labour supply. Forecasting models of labour demand have been studied, 
with only moderate success in terms of developing anything like a viable 
method.6^ Indeed, for operational decisions, models are not used. But 
they do help to concentrate research and thought around strategic vari-
ables. Demand models have also been bedevilled by "natural" corporate sec-
recy, viz. the reluctance of mining companies to fully disclose data on new 
explorations and on the drilling resuts of new ventures. Hence, output and 
demand have tended to be understated; this may account for some of the con-
tinued longevity of mines which analysts prior to 1971 had marked down for 
"extinction". 
Researchers have also investigated local labour supply. Beadle has examined 
69 
factors affecting the supply of goldmine labour; Lawrence has looked at the 
experiences of Malawian workers;'70 Parsons has reviewed short-term supply de-
terminants;''1 Hewitt has focussed on the perceived wage value of jobs as well 72 
as African production supervisors and the "drawing power" of different mines. 
Work has also been done on migrancy and policies to induce stability of labour 
73 
(cf. a 1976 seminar on the Stabilisation of Labour). In addition, the CM 
has sub-contracted research of various kinds to eleven South African Univer-
sities (key ones in the labour field being the University of Natal and Rhodes 
University) as well as outside consultants.''4 Outside of the CM, the indi-
vidual mining houses themselves also promote research on labour issues, e.g. 
in AAC and in Goldfields.75 
A notable feature of research findings is their restricted circulation. In-
deed, some reports, according to one source, are even restricted as confiden-
tial to confined upper-echelon aides of the CM and mining houses.''6 
LABOUR SUPPLY COST CONTROL 
The MLO/CM pays special attention to labour costs. It is the fons et origo 
of high profitability in the longer term. For these purposes costs are 
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carefully watched and budgetted, adverse trends being isolated for analysis 
and remedy fairly soon after deviation from projected expectations. 
The major labour supply cost control areas are in the fields of recruitment 
(notably attestation fees), direct wage costs, indirect labour costs (i.e. 
payments "in kind") and investment costs in training. 
Wenela/NRC officials and agents deal with most recruitment costs which can 
be controlled through budgeting procedures. Attestation fees are of special 
importance. Here variations occur between supplier areas. For South Africa 
a fee of R1.00 per person is payable. At present, this also applies to the 
Transkei, though it is reported that the fee for this area will probably 
soon be raised to the higher levels charged by supplier States. The Bo-
tswana (RIO.00 per recruit) and Lesotho (R11.50) fees are much on a par 
while the Rhodesian "Stamp Duty" of $RH 6.00 is of a similar order of mag-
nitude. Swaziland's attestation fee (R1.00) remains low and could well be 
changed soon. For the most part, attestation fees are used as "revenue 
raising devices" by supplier States. It would not appear at this stage that 
they are yet at a level which would itself cause any basic change in the 
CM/ML0 demand pattern between local and foreign labour. 
In addition to attestation fees, the employers must meet liabilities under 
the Bantu Labour Act, 1972. These contributions came into force on 1 Jan-
uary 1974, at which time levies on the employment of African workers were 
raised for non-gold producers. At that stage, gold mines remained exempt 
from the levies as they had been under previous legislation, because of 
adoption of a policy of only taxing their profits. The government's case 
in securing levies was that they were to finance Bantu Affairs Administration 
Boards in respect of services such as housing, transport, etc. Thus, be-
cause the industry financed much of these costs, the CM objected. However, 
in April 1975, despite protestations, levies were not only raised but were 
also extended to cover gold and uranium mines. In relation to the main 
sources of State tax income from mines, however, the levies are relatively 
small and will probably not significantly affect the overall demand for 
labour - except in so far as they may add more pressure to the case of pro-
tagonists within the "mining complex" who are pushing for rapid mechanisation. 
In the area of wages, it is probable that upward wage trends will abate in 
the short-term, but this will probably not preclude wage rises in semi-skilied 
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grades. From a broader perspective, the industry may well have an interest 
in further wage stratification. If surpluses of labour continue to grow in 
foreign labour markets, as in South Africa, it may seek to continue its 
policy of confining foreign workers to the more migrant and lower-paid tasks 
whilst reserving high-paid jobs for locals. This further fragmentation of 
the labour supply along national and social divisions could be functional to 
mining interests. 
As with other primary producers, the mines retain control over a large ele-
ment of workers' earning, about 40 percent according to the MLO General 
Manager.7'7 Some of these benefits flow from CM outlays of an "investment 
nature" e.g. in housing, etc. which have a long life span. Other outlays, 
e.g. on foodstuffs (worth millions of rands), are of a more variable charac-
ter and give employers more leverage over workers compared to a situation 
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in which the only worker/employer bond is defined in cash terms. By being 
able to buy in bulk at a discount, the CM probably in effect eliminates a 
sizeable element of "middlemen margins" which, if it paid all earnings over 
to workers as cash wages, the latter would need in order to find any given 
level of basic subsistence. A similar point applies to privatised housing 
or housing under the control of local authorities. 
Investment costs in training are a necessary industry liability in the South 
African context, given that government does not provide sufficient State-
subsidised training capacity to meet the total mine demand at various levels 
of skill. At the same time, the CM seeks to shift this liability on to the 
State and vice-versa. 
STRATEGY ON THE "DISPLACEMENT" OF LABOUR: FOREIGN FOR LOCAL 
A key structural trend in South Africa, and an explicit policy consideration 
of the mining industry has been the "generalised displacement" of labour in 
production. This process has manifested itself in two forms: the substitu-
tion of local for foreign workers and the substitution of capital for labour 
in production. This section is concerned with the former. 
It has been noted that the MLO Budget And Objectives For 1977 included the 
policy of raising the local content of labour supply. The implication is 
the "displacement" of foreign workers. This view, although expressed a 
decade after the Froneman Committee's recommendations were put forward, stands 
79 
in tune with the latter, but with some important qualifications. Thus 
whilst Froneman sought the elimination of dependence on foreign labour sup-
plies within 5 years following 1963, the Chamber has taken a more calculatedly 
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hard-headed approach: its strategy rests on "gradual displacement", selec-
tive absorption of foreign States, the application of implicit or explicit 
quotas on those included in the system, and the "siphoning-off" of the more 
skilled elements of available foreign labour supplies. 
On the latter issue, the CM would appear to be working towards the definition 
of a "safe level" of South African recruits in selected/strategic/skilled 
job categories, in so doing assessing prospective costs of rapid local re-
placement in the event of a crisis in labour supply caused by withdrawal 
against the costs of operating "above the margin" in the sense of incurring 
higher investment or wage costs to retain such a labour supply within the in-
dustry. Such strategic planning perspectives have become the order of the 
day as a result of confrontationist politics in Southern Africa. However, they 
do not affect all producers equally as some have consciously retained a low 
foreign/local labour content (especially of "Tropicals") for a number of 
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years, e.g. Anglo American, JCI and Union Corporation. 
The mines, as with other industries dependent on foreign labour, do however 
have one "stop-gap" - an apparently substantial and growing pool of local 
unemployed and underemployed African labour. This has much diminished the 
evaluation of the costs of a withdrawal crisis to mining employers. On 
Knight's estimates, for instance, "the replacement of all foreigners would 
—eh 
not nearly exhaust the total amount of underemployment." Temporary ad-
justment effects, some "shortages" of a longer-term nature in mines highly 
dependent on foreign workers and/or which pay lower wages, and probably 
greater mechanisation would seem, at this stage, to be store in such an 
eventuality. 
From the industry1s viewpoint it is clear that total displacement of foreign 
labour would not be desired in the foreseeable future, at least for 10 years. 
It could even be envisaged that, even in the event of much growth in local 
unemployment, the CM would resist pressures on it to "displace" labour be-
yond a certain minimum point, if only because of the "wage savings" this 
would imply (assuming here,probably realistically, that real wages are 
"sticky" in a downward direction). 
There is no way of estimating at present "how far" the CM would go. Its 
target for a 50 percent South African labour content is set down for April 
1977. This could be pushed a lot higher, say to 60 percent or 75 percent, 
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but would the CM wish to pursue such a policy beyond that point at which its 
balance of interest fell overly dependent on a localised work force for whom 
responsibilities and problems might shortly arise in respect of the attain-
ment of job security, old age pension, welfare, housing for families, etc.? 
It would appear rather that present profit maximisation requirements dictate 
"gradualist displacement" and the continued usage of foreign labour reserves. 
STRATEGY ON THE "DISPLACEMENT" OF LABOUR: LABOUR FOR CAPITAL 
The displacement of foreign workers is related to the substitution of capital 
for labour at the industry-wide and localised mine levels. In strict terms, 
these two processes would seem to be "mutually determining", at least in 
the short-term. 
The volume demands for capital needed in production are affected by the avail-
ability and forms of labour supply whilst the latter do, together with the 
constraints applicable to current technology and finance, help identify capi-
tal needs. A major variable in this respect is the long-run prices of basic 
mineral commodities, a subject both involved and of too much difficulty of 
assessment to allow for any simple answer here. 
The trend-volume of capital available for fixed investment, even if prices 
of capital and commodities as well as dividend share policies were known, 
could not be assessed, if only because of political factors. The re-invest-
ment rates for mining are much influenced by State tax policy as we'll as the 
subsidies outlayed by the State either to maintain "marginal mines" in pro-
duction or to extend the lease of life of the industry by lowering its im-
plicit or explicit input costs. 
Nonetheless, various mechanisms and policies suggest a capital-intensive trend. 
Tax policy provides for both investment and accelerated depreciation allow-
ances. The "natural" growth of the industry, especially in the case of gold 
mines, gives rise to a tendency for old (labour-intensive) mines to fall by 
the wayside whilst investments coming "on-stream" tend to be designed as more 
capital-intensive enterprises. Tendencies to a great share of benefication of 
total non-gold output imply capital-intensive investment patterns. Technolo-
gical research is also almost wholly in this direction. "Mechanisation with 
capital-intensification" (they should not in theory at least be confused as 
necessarily being the same thing) are clearly enunciated policies of almost all 
mining houses, the CM and its affiliates. The "voice of reason" - arguing 
for labour-intensive production to "fit" the times of surplus labour - is yet 
to be heard. It would also most likely be ignored, for financial reasons. 
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Further, "labour problems" in the last 5 years have probably confirmed, to 
the the extent of it becoming an article of faith, the deeply held view in 
the industry that highly automated plants with capital-intensive equipment 
provide for a less "troublesome" set of labour problems. And, now, there 
is the insecurity angle to dependence on imported labour. All this predis-
poses investment and planning decisions, both on capital and labour, to-
wards a policy of mechanisation. 
MECHANISATION: CONSTRAINTS AND SOME IMPLICATIONS 
The President of the Chamber of Mines in 1974 clearly enunciated an essential 
point of CM policy when he noted: "We intend that the man with the shovel 
82 
will give way to the man with the machine". 
Such a policy requires an underlying strategy, at least as far as can be 
worked out within technical and/or political limits. If there is any single 
guiding principle it is, as Mr H.F. Oppenheimer has recorded, that "the most 
unproductive jobs (should) be progressively eliminated through re-organisation 
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or mechanisation". This is easier said than done, not only because such 
jobs may not be easily identified, but because too the re-organisation and/or 
mechanisation of certain work comes against either temporary or long-term 
political or technical constraints. 
The technical conditions within which mechanisation must occur are formidable, 
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particularly on gold mines." Mechanisation of stopes needs, it it is to be 
effective, mechanised support, roof bolting and cleaning and ore removal fa-
cilities. All this must occur at great depth - at an average of one kilometre 
and often about 3000 metres - in conditions of hard rock across extensive but 
thin reefs. The depth/rock combination yields strata control problems because 
of the resultant pressures. Rock hardness also implies the need for hard in-
struments to gauge, rip or cut away the payable ore, if non-explosive extrac-
tion is to be feasible. The logistics of previous mining patterns also pose 
problems. Most mines have kilometres of face, each stope needing ventilation, 
sometimes refrigeration, as well as water and compressed air along access 
routes. It is thus possible that some mines might adopt a selective mechani-
sation policy, concentrating on certain areas before moving onto others. An 
implied mixed labour demand pattern could result. However, non-explosive min-
ing can advance production significantly, diminishing the need for excavation 
prior to blasting as well' as time spent in cleaning broken rock. Machines 
could thus (theoretically) increase ore recovery rates. Further, blasting 
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tends to scatter and dilute ore veins with waste rock, the transport of 
which raises minimum tonnage trammed per fine ounce recovered. But non-
explosive gold mining methods are difficult to develop. 
Various machines and new methods have however been examined, most focussed 
on the gold, coal and uranium sectors. A major focus has been the rock-
cutter (and allied alternatives in the shock wave rockbreaker, impact rippers 
and the swing hammer). For certain areas these rockcutters have already 
proved economic. Further, it has been found feasible to leave half the waste 
rock behind to be packed into the stoped-out area. This halves stoping width, 
resulting in improved strata and environmental control in deep-level mines as 
well as doubling the grades of ore trammed. But there remains concern with 
productivity levels associated with rockcutting equipment; and much research 
needs to be done still. 
Or 
Other areas of advance include: (a) strata control techniques (using new 
props); (b) underground vehicles; (c) electrohydraulic- equipment develop-
ment; (d) centrifugal mini-mills for underground ore crushing; (e) use 
of conveyers in mechanised stoping; and (f) computer simulation in the im-
provement of stoping systems. As with rockcutting, R & D needs to go further 
still for these to be welded together into a viable capital-intensive pro-
duction system. 
On the political side, problems can also be anticipated. Almost certainly, 
mechanisation would involve a re-definition of occupational structures arid 
the labour process. Manual tasks would fall away to a greater degree, reducing 
the demand for unskilled workers (e.g. for hand tramming) at a time of evident 
rising surplus both in South Africa and supplier States. The decisions over 
the manning of new machinery will involve a struggle not only between mine-
owners and strong organised unions. It will also invlove African workers. 
The demand for blasters - at present a "skilled job" monopolised by certified 
personnel - will also probably be reduced on a relative basis. Thus slightly 
more stratification amongst African workers can be anticipated and also a 
heightened degree of job insecurity amongst white employees, especially in 
the lower ranks which are more prone to the impact of mechanisation. On the 
other hand, the CM explicitly promise that all "African advancement" will not 
threaten anyone's employment. This could only really be so in a condition of 
rapid output growth and expansion of the industry. It,almost certainly will 
not apply to "displaced" elements of unskilled labour. 
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CONCLUSION 
The labour supply policy of the CM is in a process of change. However, it 
remains wedded in certain areas to labour policies typical of conditions of 
"primitive accumulation". It is perhaps not so much that the latter form 
of accumulation provides a large element of re-investment in the industry, 
but the transition from such a form of accumulation and its attendant labour 
structure has proved uniquely difficult for the "mining complex" in Southern 
Africa. 
Reliance on foreign labour remains likely, if only in a diminished degree, 
for the foreseeable future. The benefits for employers and the State - in 
terms of the bias this pattern provides to accumulation in Southern Africa, 
reduced liability for Unemployment Insurance Fund payments, pension and post-
employment liabilities, social security costs, health of "non-productive" 
elements of workers' dependants, and in reduced labour costs - make it an 
attractive option. The roots of policy retention lie in this sphere. 
Notes/... 
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1. Timothy Green, The World of Gold, Simon and Schuster, 1970. 
2. See variously Anglo American Corporation of South Africa Ltd., Annual 
Report 1975, Johannesburg 1976; CIS, Anti-Report: Consolidated Gold 
Fields Limited, London, 1976; Financial Mail, Gold: The Winter of our 
Discontent - A Special Survey, August 13, 1976; Financial Mail , 
Inside the Anglo Power House, July 4, 1969; Johannesburg Consolidated 
Investments, Annual Report 1976, Johannesburg, 1976. 
3. See the statement from Alex Borraine (Anglo American Corporation): 
"Hence efficiency and profitable operation, while not being our only 
objective, remains our principal objective." In Optima, 23, 2, June, 
1973, p. 67. 
4. For example, Theron's Recruiting Organisation, The Calvey Cann Recruiting 
Organisation, The Natal Coal Owners' Labour Association, J.R. Groenewald 
(Thabazimbi), Argo, Mazista and Hansen's Labour Organisation (Pty) Ltd., 
the Sugar Industry Labour Organisation. Some of these agencies recruit 
in foreign States but the numbers are not substantial. 
5. Interview with MLO official, January, 1976. 
6. For example Mr J.A. Gemmill (Bantu Labour Adviser to the Chamber of Mines 
up to 1973), whose father was also closely involved with Wenela/MLO. 
Since 1974 this post has been taken over by Mr A.C. Fleischer (the 
designation also being altered at the time to "Adviser on Black Labour"), 
the current General Manager of MLO. 
7. See Chamber of Mines, Research Review, 1963, pp. 22-23, hereafter cited 
as C.M., R.R., 1963. 
8. Ibid. 
9. Ibid. • 
10. As of April, 1976 there has been no evidence of a change in status 
regarding Malawian contractees. 
11. See Mine Labour Organisations (Wenela) Ltd., Reports and Financial 
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For a full listing of such factors see UNDP, E. Kwame Afriyre, Report 
on the Preliminary Investigation of Migrant Mine Labour in Ngamiland, 
Technical Note No. 7, Gaborone, 1976, (mimeo). 
C.M., R.R., 1965, p. 52. 
See D.G. Clarke, Contract Labour From Rhodesia to the South African Gold 
Mines: A Study of~~the International Division o f a Labour Reserve, SALDRU 
Working Paper No. 6, University of Cape Town, 1976. 
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TABLE 1 
CHAMBER OF MINES 
MINING HOUSE EMPLOYERS 
1970-1975 
Year AAC ' ATC GMFC JCI Goldfields Rand Mines Unicorp. 
Total 
Gold 
Coal 
1970 112,115 37,782 36,319 16,492 59,521 60,800 44,259 367,422 33,749 
1971 113,119 33,918 35,592 16,168 57,844 55,254 39,944 351 ,839 34,335 
1972 118,077 34,292 37,620 16,995 59,299 46,236 52,652 379,599 34,774 
1973 118,395 27,551 40,045 18,502 55,868 64,823 59,813 389,357 32,824 
1974 106,681 21,779 32,629 15,211 44,334 57,939 56,288 330,523 32,977 
1975 104,297 23,063 31,315 15,372 48,038 52,004 51,952 329,755 34,903 
Source: Mine Labour Organisations (Wenela), Ltd. Reports and Financial Statements 
(1970-1975 inclusive), Johannesburg. 
Note: The total for gold mines does not strictly add up. It excludes 74 workers 
employed on "sundry mines" (mostly the Lonrho Group). 
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TABLE 2 
CHAMBER OF MINES 
GOLDMINES 
WORKING REVENUE, COSTS AND PROFITS 
1970-1975 
(Rands) 
Year 
Working Revenue 
Per Metric Ton 
Working Costs 
Per Metric Ton 
Working Profit 
Per Metric Ton 
1970 11.24 7.24 3.90 
1971 12.36 7.88 4.48 
1972 16.25 8.79 7.46 
1973 23.93 10.51 13.42 
1974 34.70 13.18 21.52 
1975 34.45 16.71 17.74 
Source: Chamber of Mines, Annual Reports (1970-1975 inclusive). 
Johannesburg. 
Note: The above are based on "average declared" values for 
members of the Chamber. 
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TABLE 3 
CHAMBER OF MINES 
GOLDMINES 
DIVIDENDS DECLARED 
1970-1975 
(Millions of Rands) 
Year Value 
Dividend Value 
Per Kgs. Fine 
Dividend/'Non-White' 
Wage Bill Ratios 
1970 143,5 14.5 1.67 
1971 142,4 14.7 1.55 
1972 196,3 21.8 1.89 
1973 320,2 37.9 2.18 
1974 565,8 75.2 2.54 
1975. 522,8 74.4 1.48 
Source: Chamber of Mines, Annual Reports (1970-1975 inclusive). 
Johannesburg. 
Note: The wage bill referred to reflects that of coal and 
gold mines. 
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TABLE 4 
CHAMBER OF MINES 
'NON-WHITE' EMPLOYEES 
AVERAGE NUMBER AT WORK AND SURFACE/UNDERGROUND ALLOCATION 
1970-1975 
Year 
Underground Surface 
Total 
Gold Coal Gold Coal 
1970 292,532 24,177 78,007 10,929 405,645 
1971 294,278 25,132 77,626 11,153 408,194 
1972 285,309 25,190 75,450 11,288 397,237 
1973 301',147 24,165 76,572 11 ,133 413,017 
1974 275,453 24,179 75,207 11,355 386,194 
1975 249,728 25,124 73,356 12,110 360,318 
Source: Chamber of Mines, 
Johannesburg. 
Annual Reports (1970-1975 inclusive). 
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